Mobile Crowd-Sensing (MCS) is a dominant sensing paradigm for Internet of Things (IoT), with a lot of potentials as it allows data collection through the user's sensor embedded mobile devices. The participation of people in IoT not only brings greater flexibility and sensing ability but also increases the risk of privacy breaches to the participants. Primarily, a worker's location data is vulnerable to information leaks as the task assignment in MCS is location-based. Most existing mechanisms that preserve worker's location in MCS are designed under the assumption that the platform is trusted, which may be not valid in realworld applications. Besides, the existing studies focus either on task selection problem for workers or task assignment problem for the platform. Therefore, this paper investigates both task bidding and assignment while preserving location privacy. We propose two task selection strategies: Minimize Total Cost (MTC) and Minimize Average Cost (MAC). Each worker submits a cost that is obfuscated using differential privacy to the platform. We propose probability cost-efficient worker selection mechanism (PCE-WSM) to determine winners and probability individual-rationality critical payment mechanism (PIR-CPM) to determine payments to winners. We prove that PIR-CPM is truthful and can achieve probability-individual rationality by theoretical analysis. To evaluate our proposed strategies, we conduct extensive experiments on both synthetic and real-world datasets, and the experimental results validate that PCE-WSM can achieve enough privacy preservation without incurring a high payment.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the growing popularity of smartphones, mobile crowd-sensing (MCS) is becoming an emerging sensing paradigm for Internet of Things (IoT). Benefiting from highperformance CPU, high-speed 5G networks, large-capacity memory, and powerful embedded sensors, smartphones can now provide stronger computing, communication, storage and sensory ability than single-function sensors in IoT. Moreover, human participation makes it more flexible and efficient to collect data. All these features give rise to various IoT applications, e.g., environment monitoring, infrastructure management, and social sensing [1] .
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Anfeng Liu. In general, a typical MCS system consists of three components, task requesters (requesting tasks), a crowd of workers (performing tasks), and an intermediate platform whose responsibility is to get tasks from the requesters and distribute them to workers. To efficiently allocate tasks, reverse auctionbased mechanisms are always adopted between workers and the platform. In reverse auction, workers act as sellers selling sensing service, and platform serves as the buyer buying sensing service. First, the platform publishes tasks to the workers, which they need to perform. These tasks usually have some strict requirements on location, time, and so on. Then, workers bid their tasks according to their location and constrained capacity, with a price. Finally, the platform selects some winners, from the bidders to perform tasks. The selected workers will be paid for their service. In reverse VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ auction, how to bid tasks to gain more rewards for a worker and how to select workers to finish all tasks with less payment for the platform are two significant problems. Most of the existing studies mainly focus on the task assignment problem. Some of them work on designing truthful incentive mechanisms to motivate workers to participate, as the number of workers has a strong impact on the performance of MCS [2] - [4] . Liu et al. worked on improving the reliability of collecting sensed data in CPS [5] . While others work on finding an efficient matching between workers and tasks to minimize the social costs or the total payment to workers, while simultaneously maximizing the task accomplishment rate or the total revenue gain for the platform [6] . Note that all these works are proposed from the platform's perspective. However, a few of them focus on task bidding with respect to workers. In addition, privacy issues have raised significantly; data trading over big IoT data has become a business [7] . All these threats to worker's location information which hinders their participation in MCS [8] , [9] .
A worker's location data may be disclosed through sensor data or during task bidding. First, sensor data inevitably contains a worker's location since the worker must travel to the task location to perform it in MCS [10] . Second, during task bidding worker's location may also be revealed to the platform or others through communication link [11] - [13] , phishing attacks [14] and single attack [15] . However, the platform may be malicious, and it can infer the worker's location from the bidding tasks and price as the platform knows the relationship between the worker's cost and traveling distance. Additionally, worker's bid may be leaked when the auction results are published to the public by the platform, to exhibit auction fairness. Some of those may be malicious, and they may infer other workers' bids by changing their bids in the following auction and observe changes in auction results. During this process, they can also infer other sensitive personal information similar to the malicious platform.
Numerous solutions were proposed to prevent location information leakage either while publishing the worker's bid in auction results during task assignment [16] - [18] , or from the bid itself during task bidding [19] - [21] . However, most of the proposed mechanisms assume that either the MCS system has a trusted platform, or that each worker can only perform a single task, which reduces privacy protection and worker utility. Besides, most published works only refer to bid privacy without focusing on possible location inferring attacks that happen through the workers' bids. In this paper, we will give detailed location disclosure threat analysis in Section IV, and we would like to preserve worker's location privacy against the semi-honest platform and other workers (i.e., they follow the protocol but try to infer others' sensitive information). Worker's location privacy is preserved irrespective of whether he is selected for the auction or not.
There are several challenges to achieving location privacyaware task bidding and assignment for MCS. First, both the task bidding problem from the worker's perspective and task assignment problem from the platform's perspective are NP-hard. Second, each worker is selfish and desires to gain more rewards; therefore, they may lie about their true cost during the reverse auction. It is necessary and challenging to design a truthful incentive mechanism for the platform. Additionally, in the interest of privacy, workers are allowed to submit obfuscated costs in the auction, instead of real costs. This makes it difficult to design an efficient task assignment mechanism for the platform.
In this paper, we propose a location privacy-aware task bidding and task assignment for workers and platform, respectively. For workers, we propose two task selection strategies: minimize total cost and minimize average cost. Under the former strategy, workers try to maximize the number of selected tasks under their constrained travel budget to gain more rewards. Under the later strategy, workers try to maximize the cost-efficient to win in the auction. Note that getting more rewards does not mean achieving higher utilities. To preserve worker's location leakage from the bid, each worker will sanitize the real cost with differential privacy. The workers submit a bid with the selected tasks, obfuscated cost, and differential privacy budget to the platform for selling their sensing service. For the platform, we design a probabilistic cost-efficient worker selection mechanism (PCE-WSM) and a probabilistic individual-rationality critical payment mechanism (PIR-CPM). In each iteration, we select the worker with the largest probability of being the most cost-efficient to minimize the total cost for the platform. We adopt the critical payment mechanism to achieve a truthful payment. A worker can gain no more rewards than bidding his true cost. Since the workers' true costs are unknown to the platform, we achieve a probabilistic individual-rationality. Our main contributions are summarized as follows:
• To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that realizes both task bidding and task assignment with location privacy-awareness in Mobile Crowd-Sensing systems, simultaneously. It is also the first work that gives a detailed analysis of location disclosure threats during task bidding.
• We propose a location privacy-aware task bidding for workers, and provide two task selection mechanisms: MTC-TSM and MAC-TSM. They aim to minimize the total cost and the average cost for task selection, respectively. The worker submits an obfuscated cost to the platform for privacy considerations.
• We propose a location privacy-aware task assignment for the platform. We design the PCE-WSM to select workers to minimize the total cost with obfuscated cost and differential privacy budget from the workers. Also, we design the PIR-CPM to determine the payment to each winner to achieve truthful and probabilistic individual-rationality with unknown workers' real cost.
• We conduct both theoretical analysis and extensive experiments to evaluate our proposed mechanisms. We prove that the proposed PIR-CPM satisfies the truthful and probabilistic individual-rationality properties, and the experimental results demonstrate that the proposed PCE-WSM is very efficient in worker selection. The rest of paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we discuss the related works about privacy-preserving in MCS. In Section III, we describe the system model and formulation problem. Then, we give a detailed analysis of location disclosure threats during task bidding in Section IV. We present our proposed mechanisms: location privacyaware task bidding in Section V and task assignment in Section VI, respectively. We conduct extensive experiments to evaluate the performance of our proposed mechanisms in Section VII and finally conclude the paper in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORKS A. TASK SELECTION IN MCS
Task selection is a worker's strategy that determines which tasks he can perform after receiving the published tasks from the platform. It is also called Worker Selected Tasks (WST) mode in [22] . Alt et al. [23] proposed a spatial crowdsourcing system, in which the workers are allowed to browse available spatial tasks and select tasks that they are interested in. Deng et al. [24] proposed a task selection mechanism for workers that maximizes the number of performed tasks. Cheung et al. [25] proposed an asynchronous and distributed task selection (ADTS) algorithm to help users plan their task selection to maximize their payoff. The studies in [26] , [27] focused on the task selection problem with location privacy preservation and proposed efficient task selection mechanisms to maximize workers profits. However, these studies do not consider location privacy leakage from the task bids. In addition, the worker model and privacy definition are also different from our problem.
B. WORKER SELECTION IN MCS
Worker selection is a platform strategy that determines which workers should be selected after receiving their bids. It is also called Server Assigned Tasks (SAT) mode in [22] . There are more studies focused on worker selection or task assignment compared to task selection, as it can achieve global optimal from the platform's perspective. For example, the study in [28] aims at maximizing the total number of tasks accomplished while minimizing the total movement distance. Li et al. [29] proposed a dynamic participant recruitment mechanism which aims at minimizing the sensing cost while maintaining a certain level of probabilistic coverage. He et al. [30] exploited the exchange economy theory to model the interaction between all three parties involved in MCS and devised a polynomial algorithm to provide a desirable solution for them. The most related work is [31] , which achieves truthfulness, individual rationality, and high computation efficient task assignment mechanism. Nevertheless, it does not consider bid privacy, and the workers' real cost is known to the platform.
C. LOCATION PRIVACY PRESERVATION IN MCS
Location privacy preservation has been an important topic in Location-Based Services, MCS, Social Networks and Smart City [32] - [37] . Studies in [38] , [39] focus on protecting worker's privacy leakage from the sensed data during data aggregation. Works in [40] - [42] protects worker's identity leakage from the collected data and task bids in reverse auction through anonymity, respectively. Works in [16] - [18] proposed differential private incentive mechanisms to protect worker's bid privacy from malicious worker during task assignment. However, the platform is assumed to be trusted, or there is a trusted third party (TTP) in these studies, which may not be true in real applications.
To protect worker's bid privacy from the platform, differential privacy has always been adopted to perturb a worker's location or travel distance. Wang et al. [19] proposed location privacy-preserving task allocation with differential geoobfuscation; the server sends the Geo-Obfuscation function to the worker to obfuscate its actual location. To et al. [20] proposed a privacy-preserving online task assignment mechanism with the untrusted server, the locations of both tasks and workers are perturbed based on geo-indistinguishability. The study in [21] allows workers to submit obfuscated distance as well as its privacy level to the server, and the server allocates each task to the worker who has the largest probability of being closest to it to minimize the total travel distance. However, each worker can only perform one task in these studies, which reduces the worker utility and increases the platform cost, simultaneously. In this paper, each worker can perform multiple tasks which is more efficient than performing a single task.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION A. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a Mobile Crowd-Sensing system consisting of a platform and a crowd of workers. The platform publishes a set of location-aware sensing tasks that are to be performed by the workers. Let T denote the sensing tasks, T = {t 1 , t 2 , · · · , t m }, and each task t i has a unique location l t i . The sensing task can be performed only when the worker travels to the task's location. There are n workers who are willing to perform sensing tasks for rewards. We use W to denote the workers, W = {w 1 , w 2 , · · · , w n }, and each worker has his location l w i and a travel budget b w i . The worker can travel to perform a set of tasks T i starting from his current location and then return, where T i ⊆ T . The total travel distance is limited by his travel budget b w i .
To allocate tasks efficiently in Mobile Crowd-Sensing system, we model the interaction between the platform and workers as a reverse auction. The platform is the buyer who wants to buy sensing service from workers (sellers). The interaction is described as follows.
1) The platform publishes a set of tasks T to all workers W in the Mobile Crowd-Sensing system. 2) Each worker w i can submit a bid β i = (T i , b i ) to the platform, where T i is a subset of sensing tasks that the worker w i would like to perform, T i ⊆ T , and b i is the claimed cost that the worker wants to be paid at least, VOLUME 7, 2019 by the platform (Task Bidding Mechanism). Note that each worker could submit no more than one bid. 3) After receiving workers' bids, the platform determines which workers are the winners (Worker Selection Mechanism), and how much should be paid to each winner (Payment Determination Mechanism). The platform selects a subset S of winners from all workers, S ⊆ W , and informs each winner w i ∈ S to perform the set of sensing tasks T i and the payment p i it will get after finishing the bid tasks. 4) Each winner performs his bid tasks and sends the sensed data to the platform, then get his payment from the platform. To encourage the worker to bid his true cost, the platform will design a truthful payment mechanism where the worker cannot get more rewards by submitting an untruthful bid. So the worker will bid his true cost to compete in the reverse auction. However, the worker's location may be revealed to the platform when he submits a truthful bid (Detailed in Section IV). To prevent the platform from getting a worker's location, the worker can adopt differential privacy to perturb his cost. Then, the worker submits a triple bid β i = (T i ,b i , i ) to the platform, whereb i is the perturbed cost and i is the differential privacy budget. Now, the platform needs to determine winners and payment under obfuscated bids.
B. PROBLEM FORMULATION
There are three major decision problems in the reverse auction, Task Bidding Problem for workers, Worker Selection Problem, and Payment Determination Problem for the platform.
1) TASK BIDDING PROBLEM
Task bidding problem includes two parts: task selection and bidding price. First, a worker w i , aims to select a set of tasks T i under a constrained travel budget B i to maximize his utility. Intuitively, the worker can get more rewards when he performs more tasks, so the worker needs to maximize the number of tasks. However, the worker may not be selected as a winner and gets nothing in the reverse auction. To promote a worker's competitiveness in the reverse auction, the worker can minimize the average cost of performing tasks. Here, we give these two strategies for task selection.
a: MINIMIZE THE TOTAL COST TASK SELECTION PROBLEM (MTC-TSP)
The worker selects a set of tasks T i under the limited travel budget B i so that the number of selected tasks is maximized and the total cost of performing the most tasks is minimized. The problem is formulated as follows.
where D(T i ) is the travel cost of visiting a sequence of tasks T i and returning to the worker's location, |T i | is the number of tasks in set T i , | T | is the maximum number of selected tasks under the constrained travel budget. We can easily prove this problem to be NP-hard. Assuming that the selected tasks are known, the problem now is to find the shortest path that visits each task and returns to the worker's location. This is the traveling salesman problem which has been proved to be NP-complete. Therefore, minimizing the total cost of tasks in TSP is NP-hard.
b: MINIMIZE THE AVERAGE COST TASK SELECTION PROBLEM (MAC-TSP)
The worker tries to select to a set of tasks T i from all tasks T , with the minimum average cost under the limited travel budget B i . The problem can be formulated as follows.
min
The objective is to minimize the average cost of the selected tasks. As the criteria for a winner in worker selection is cost-efficiency, a worker with a lower average cost is more likely to be selected in the auction. Since the average travel cost always changes with the addition of a new task's location, we need to check all available solutions to find the minimum average cost. The time complexity of a brute force search algorithm is O(k!), and k is the number of available tasks within a worker's travel budget.
Second, after task selection, the worker should bid a price for the selected tasks. To win in the truthful auction, the worker should bid his true travel cost c d i . Here c d i = D(T i ). However, to protect the real travel cost from the platform, the worker can select a privacy budget i to sanitize his real travel cost. Then, the worker bids the selected tasks with its sanitized travel cost.
2) WORKER SELECTION PROBLEM
The platform aims to select a set of workers S, with obfuscated bid price, such that the total cost of all tasks can be minimized.
The objective is to minimize the total cost of all tasks while each worker bids an obfuscated cost. The first constraint indicates that all the tasks are finished. Here, we assume that there are enough workers, and more than one worker competes for each task. If there is a task that no worker bids for, that particular task must not be finished, clearly. If a task is only covered by one worker's bid, it will be rigged by that worker, we cannot guarantee truthfulness. The worker selection problem has been proved to be NP-hard in [31] . Worse still, it becomes more difficult to minimize the total cost when the workers' real costs are unknown to the platform.
3) PAYMENT DETERMINATION PROBLEM
The platform needs to determine the payment for each winner by considering the real cost, and privacy protection level. In order to motivate workers, and encourage them to submit the real travel cost, the payment determination mechanism should satisfy the following properties.
• Individual Rationality: The worker should have a nonnegative utility when he is selected as a winner to perform his bid tasks.
• Truthfulness: A worker can not get more utilities by submitting a faked travel cost, no matter what others do.
The utility of worker w i , is the difference between the payment p i it receives from the platform and his real cost c i to take all tasks in T i . A worker's real cost c i , includes travel distance cost c d i and privacy cost c p i . Here we adapt the linear privacy cost model in [43] where, c p i = α i with α representing the cost of unit privacy leakage, and i is the privacy budget. Therefore, the utility of worker w i can be computed as follows.
Note that a worker can not get more utility by cheating his privacy budget i , since the real travel cost is sanitized according to the selected privacy budget, and both the sanitized travel cost and privacy budget are sent to the platform directly. Therefore, the worker will not cheat his selected privacy budget. In addition, each worker submits a sanitized travel cost. This makes it challenging to design a payment determination mechanism satisfying Individual Rationality and Truthfulness.
IV. LOCATION DISCLOSURE THREATS DURING TASK BIDDING
In this section, we analyze location disclosure threats during task bidding in reverse auction. We assume that the platform is malicious and wants to infer the worker's location through their bidding; this is usually true in a real-world MCS application. To win in the truthful reverse auction, each worker will bid their real cost as the price. The cost of a worker taking a task consists of three parts: travel distance cost, data collection cost, and data uploading cost. While the last two costs may be determined by the task itself and are public knowledge (known to everyone), the platform can calculate the travel cost easily by subtracting these costs from the worker's bidding price. To simplify, the cost of worker w i performing task t j is defined to be the Euclidean distance d(l w i , l t j ) between the worker's location and task's location as (5) .
First, we consider the multi-bid model where a worker is allowed to submit multi task-bid pairs and assign multiple tasks. For each task in his task set, he can submit a bid. In a truthful reverse auction, the worker's bid must be equal to his true cost. However, the platform can infer the worker's location according to these bid-pairs. Suppose a worker submits three task-bid pairs (t 1 , d 1 ), (t 2 , d 2 ), (t 3 , d 3 ) as shown in Fig. 1a , the platform can infer that the worker must be located within the black intersecting region of the three circles. Even worse, the inference location can be located within a smaller area with an increase in the number of task-bid pairs.
To prevent this kind of location privacy disclosure, Wang et al. [21] adopt differential privacy to perturb the true distance cost. A worker submits each task-bid pair with a privacy budget , then the added noise η i ∼ Laplace(0, 1/ i ), the bid will be the obfuscated costd i instead of real cost d i , whered i = d i + η i . In this case, the platform can still infer a worker's location. For a task-bid pair (t i ,d i , i ), the probability of worker being located within the (d i −η i ,d i +η i ) annular region can be computed as follows.
Suppose a worker submitted three task-bid pairs (t 1 ,d 1 , 1 ), (t 2 ,d 2 , 2 ), (t 3 ,d 3 , 3 ) as shown in Fig. 1b , the platform can infer that the worker must be located in the black intersecting region with the probability of 3 i=1 (1 − e −η i i ). The location privacy will also disclose more with an increase in the number of task-bid pairs.
Then, we consider the single-bid model where each worker can only submit a bid for a set of tasks. Suppose, a worker submits a bid ({t 1 , t 2 }, d 1 ) to the platform, the platform can infer that the worker must be located within the elliptic region with a focal distance |t 1 t 2 |/2 and major axis d 1 − |t 1 t 2 | as shown in Fig. 2 . Also, the platform can further determine that the worker must be located within the black filled area. That is because the worker in the white area has d i3 + d i2 + |t 2 t 3 | ≤ d i1 + d i2 + |t 1 t 2 |, he will bid task t 2 and t 3 with smaller cost to win the auction when he can only perform two tasks. The platform can further lock the worker's location in a smaller area when there are many tasks around the worker, which means a more accurate location is disclosed.
In both multi-bid and single-bid models, the platform can infer a worker's location. These kinds of inference attacks are practical in most MCS applications. In the multi-bid model, even if each bid-task pair is protected by differential privacy, the platform can infer the worker's location with high probability. In the single-bid model, we try to protect worker's bid privacy by perturbing the real cost with differential privacy as in [21] . And the disclosed privacy will not increase with the number of tasks in one's bid.
V. PRIVACY-AWARE TASK BIDDING FOR A WORKER
In this section, we focus on the task bidding problem by taking bid privacy into consideration, and design two task selection mechanisms to minimize the total cost and the average cost, respectively. After task selection, the worker sends the selected tasks, sanitized travel distance, and differential privacy budget to the platform to bid for tasks.
First, we propose a Minimize Total Cost Task Selection Mechanism (MTC-TSM) minimize the total cost under the maximum number of selected tasks. Though this problem has been proved to be NP-hard in Section III, the time complexity of the brute force search algorithm is O(k!), where k is the number of tasks within the worker's travel budget. It is still meaningful to design an efficient optimal algorithm when k is small, which is usually true in a real application. We adopt a greedy strategy and pruning strategy to improve the algorithm's efficiency, and the Laplace mechanism to sanitize the travel cost.
A. GREEDY STRATEGY
At each task selection, we always select the task which has the maximum number of available tasks in its next step. Our objective is to maximize the number of selected tasks under the constrained travel budget, then minimize the total cost. With the greedy strategy, we can find the optimal solution as early as possible.
B. PRUNING STRATEGY 1) During each selection, we will remove the tasks that violate the travel budget from left tasks as follows:
where T i is the selected tasks set, t c is the last task in T i , T l is the left available tasks set. We can get |T l | ≤ |T − T i |, then the time complexity of the algorithm is far less than O(k!).
2) We can prune a search according to our optimal objective. If |T i | + |T l | > |T opt |, then this search branch can be pruned, where T opt is the current optimal task selection. That is because it can't achieve the maximum number of selected tasks even when all left tasks can be selected without violating the travel budget.
C. LAPLACE MECHANISM
We sanitize the bid price b i with the worker's privacy budget i . The sanitized bid priceb i can be computed as follows.
where η i is a variable that follows the Laplace distribution. We now show how to draw a η i that follows Laplace distribution. First, we get the cumulative distribution function (cdf) C i (η i ):
where f (x) is the probability density function (pdf) of Laplace distribution, sgn(x) is Sign function. C i (η i ) represents the probability that the added noise is smaller than η i . Then we can draw a random number p uniformly in an interval [0, 1), and set η i = C −1 i (p) :
where C −1 i (p) is the inverse function of C i (η i ). We build a solution space tree by a depth-first method. A route that starts from the root and ends at a leaf node is a solution. The detailed task selection process is as follows.
1) Initialize the worker's location as the root node and set it as the current node. 2) Find out what tasks the worker can perform in the next step without violating the travel budget by (7) . 3) Sort these tasks according to the number of its available tasks in the next step in non-increasing order. 4) Prune tasks according to the Pruning Strategy 2 and add the remaining tasks as child nodes of the current node. 5) If there are unvisited child nodes, then set the first unvisited child node as the current node and mark it as visited, and go to step 2. Otherwise, a solution is found and update the maximum number of selected tasks. Set its father node as the current node and go to step 6. 6) If the current node is the root node and all its child nodes have been visited, go to step 7. Otherwise, go to step 5. 7) Find the solution with minimum total travel cost and maximum number of selected tasks. Then adopt the Laplace mechanism to sanitize the minimum total travel cost with its privacy budget.
Second, we propose a Minimize Average Cost Task Selection Mechanism (MAC-TSM) to minimize the average cost under the constrained travel budget. Similar to MAC-TSM, we adopt a greedy strategy and pruning strategy to design an efficient optimal algorithm. And we choose the same Laplace Mechanism in MTC-TSM to sanitize the bid price. The main difference is the greedy and pruning rule.
D. GREEDY STRATEGY
At each task selection, we always select the task with minimum travel distance cost. Our objective is to minimize the average cost.
E. PRUNING STRATEGY
The first pruning strategy is the same as the Pruning Strategy 1 in MTC-TSM. The second pruning strategy is similar to the Pruning Strategy 2 in MTC-TSM.
|D(T opt )| , then this search branch can be pruned. That is because it can't achieve the minimum average cost even when all left available tasks can be performed with zero travel cost. Now we give the pseudo-code of task selection in algorithm 1. Note that, it is the basic computing framework for MTC-TSM and MAC-TSM which varies in the optimal objective (line 15), greedy strategy (line 6) and pruning strategy (line 10 and line 11).
Algorithm 1 TSM Algorithm
Input: A set of sensing tasks T , the location l w i , travel budget B i and differential privacy budget i for worker w i . Output: The bid β i = (T i ,b i ) for worker w i , where T i is a set of bid tasks, andb i is the obfuscated bid price. 1: T i ← ∅,b i ← 0, b i ← 0; 2: Initialize the worker's location as the root node root, get its child nodes T l = {t j |d(l w i , l t j ) ≤ B i /2, t j ∈ T }; 3: Set the root node as the current node t c ; 4: while there is an un-visited root's child node do 5: Get T l for t c by Pruning Strategy 1; 6: Find the first un-visited t j ∈ T l by Greedy Strategy; 7: if t j exists then 8: T i ← T i ∪ t j , update D(T i ), mark t j as visited; 9: Add t j as the current node's child; 10: Get T l for t j by Pruning Strategy 1; 11: Prune T l by Pruning Strategy 2; 12: if |T l | > 0 then 13: Set t j as the current node t c ; 14: else 15: Update T opt by optimal objective; 16: end if 17: else 18: Set the current node's father node as t c ; 19: end if 20: end while 21: Compute the bid price b i = D(T opt ) + α i ; 22: Sanitize b i with privacy budget i by (8); 23: 
VI. PRIVACY-AWARE TASK ASSIGNMENT FOR THE PLATFORM
In this section, we focus on the task assignment problem for the platform, while the bid price is obfuscated by the Laplace mechanism. We split the task assignment problem into two subproblems: worker selection problem and payment determination problem, and propose the Probabilistic Cost-Efficient Worker Selection Mechanism (PCE-WSM) and Probabilistic Individual-Rationality Critical Individual Payment Mechanism (PIR-CPM).
A. PROBABILISTIC COST-EFFICIENT WORKER SELECTION MECHANISM
After receiving all bids from workers, each bid β i can be denoted as β i = (T i ,b i , i ), where T i is the bid task set, b i is the obfuscated bid price with differential privacy budget i , the platform needs to select some workers to finish all tasks. As previously analyzed in section III, the worker selection problem is NP-hard.
We propose an approximate algorithm PCE-WSM that adopts the same greedy strategy in [31] . The greedy rule is to select the most cost-efficient bid at each selection until all tasks are finished. The cost-efficiency of a bid is defined as follow:
whereT denotes the set of tasks that can be finished by selected workers,T = ∪ w j ∈S T j , and S denotes the workers who have won before w i . b i is the real cost of worker w i , which is unknown to the platform, it can be computed by (8) . Then the r(β i ) can be computed as follows:
Note that η i is a variable which follows the Laplace distribution, η i ∼ Laplace(0, 1/ i ). Therefore, the r(β i ) is uncertain and we cannot rank the bids accurately, according to r(β i ). To solve this problem, we try to find the bid with the largest probability of being the most cost-efficient at each selection.
For any two bids β i and β j , we can compute the probability of r(β i ) no larger than r(β j ) as follows:
where η i and η j are variables which follow the Laplace distribution, η i ∼ Laplace(0, 1/ i ), η j ∼ Laplace(0, 1/ j ). All othersb i ,b j , i , j are known by the platform, i = |T i −T | and j = |T i −T |. The above equation can be computed by double integral as follows:
where R is the integral region that can be denoted by (15) , and f (η i , η j ) is the joint probability density function of (η i , η j ). Since the two variables η i and η j are independent of each other, their joint probability density function is equal to the product of their probability density functions. Then the f (η i , η j ) can be computed as follows:
Finally, we can get P(r(β i ) ≤ r(β j )) as follows:
It is time-consuming to calculate the integral by a computer. Here, we derive the integral result manually which greatly reduces the computation time. The result of integral can be obtained by the following equation easily with computer.
where α = j i , β =b j − j ib i , and sgn(x) is the Sign function. The detailed derivation is shown in the appendix.
If P(r(β i ) ≤ r(β j )) > 1/2, we can say that the worker w i will have a greater cost-efficiency than worker w j with a larger probability, and it is better to select worker w i over worker w j .
The pseudo-code of PCE-WSM is shown in Algorithm 2. In each iteration, the platform removes those bids that have been covered by selected bids. Then, the platform compares all left bids, and find the one that is the most cost-efficient with a larger probability by (17) . After each selection, the platform will update the selected workers set S, and finished tasks setT , and the total cost C.
B. PROBABILISTIC INDIVIDUAL-RATIONALITY CRITICAL PAYMENT MECHANISM
To encourage workers to participate in MCS and submit its real cost to the platform, we propose the Probabilistic Individual-Rationality Critical Payment Mechanism (PIR-CPM). The critical payment mechanism is always adopted in the auction to guarantee truthful property, and the rule is that a worker can not win in the auction if he bids more Algorithm 2 PCE-WSM Algorithm Input: A set of sensing tasks T , all submitted bids
. Output: Set of selected workers S and total cost C.
1: S ← ∅, C ← 0,T ← ∅; 2: whileT = T do 3: β min ← ∅, k = 0; 4: for all β i ∈ B do 5: if T i ⊆T then 6 :
else if β min == ∅ then 8: β min ← β i , k = i; 9: else if P(r(β i ) ≤ r(β min )) > 1/2 then 10: β min ← β i , k = i; 11: end if 12: end for 13 :
than a critical value [44] . Therefore, the main challenge is to find the critical value.
Since the PCE-WSM selects the most cost-efficient bid with a higher probability at each selection, a bid β i will lose in this round of worker selection if and only if P(r(β i ) ≤ r(β k )) < 1/2, where β k is the most cost-efficient bid with a higher probability in the left bids. P(r(β i ) ≤ r(β k )) can be computed as follows:
where η k ∼ Laplace(0, 1/ k ), whose probability density function is an even function. Therefore, to make the above equation smaller than 1/2,b k − k i b i should be smaller than 0, then we can derive the following theorem.
Theorem 1: The platform will select worker w k rather than worker w i if and only if b i > |T i −T | |T k −T |b k in a round of worker selection in PCE-WSM.
A bid β i will not be selected in the following worker selection when all its bid tasks T i have been finished by the selected tasksT , as it will be removed from the submitted bids when T i ⊆T .
Then we can get the critical value for bid β i as follows: 1) At each selection, we find the critical bid β k that makes bid β i lose, and update its claimed real cost b i for β i as follows by Theorem 1:
2) The selection process will stop until T i ⊆T . Now, the claimed cost b i should be the critical value for bid β i . If the worker w i bids more than b i , it will not win in the Algorithm 3 PIR-CPM Algorithm Input: Work w i 's bid β i , all other workers' bids
β min ← ∅, k = 0; 4: for all β j ∈ B − β i do 5: if T j ⊆T then 6 :
else if β min == ∅ then 8: β min ← β j , k = j; 9: else if P(r(β j ) ≤ r(β min )) > 1/2 then 10: β min ← β j , k = j; 11: end if 12: end for 13 :
end if 16 :T ←T ∪ T k , p i ← b i ; 17: end while 18: return p i ; worker selection and will get zero rewards. The pseudo-code is shown in Algorithm 3.
Next, we analyze the individual rationality and truthfulness of PIR-CPM. As the worker's real cost is unknown to the platform, it is challenging to guarantee, individual rationality but, can provide probabilistic individual rationality. The probabilistic individual rationality can be defined as follows:
Definition 1: (γ -Individual Rationality) A payment mechanism satisfies γ -Individual Rationality if each worker gains a non-negative utility with a probability of at least γ .
When the platform pays each selected worker with the critical value, the probability of a worker having a nonnegative utility can be computed as follows:
Theorem 2: The proposed PIR-CPM can achieve min w i ∈S P(p i > b i )-Individual Rationality.
Proof: For each worker w i in selected worker set S, the worker will be paid a critical value p i , the probability of worker w i having a non-negative utility is P(p i > b i ), which can be computed by (21) .
For all selected workers, each of them will have a non-negative utility with a probability of at least min w i ∈S P(p i > b i ). Therefore, the proposed PIR-CPM can achieve min w i ∈S P(p i > b i )-Individual Rationality.
Theorem 3: The proposed PIR-CPM is truthful.
Proof: 1) The proposed PCE-WSM is monotonic. Assume that a worker w i is selected in the k-iteration, he will also win if his claimed cost b i = b i − ξ and ξ > 0 in the k-iteration or even earlier iteration. We can add a new bid β i = {T i ,b i , i } into B, the platform will select β i instead of β i in the k-iteration according to (17) . In addition, it may be selected in the earlier iteration when it is more cost-efficient than other bids. This proves that the proposed PCE-WSM is monotonic.
2) Each selected worker w i ∈ S is paid the critical value. If a worker w i is selected with claimed cost b i , he will also win when he submits a lower claimed cost for the same bid tasks. However, he must lose in the auction if the claimed cost is more than the payment p i . Because, its claimed cost is updated as the critical value which makes it lose after each selection, and the algorithm 3 stops when all its bid tasks are finished. The worker will not win in the following iterations. This proves that each selected worker w i ∈ S is paid the critical value.
Combining 1 and 2, we can derive that the proposed PIR-CPM is truthful according to [44] .
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we conduct extensive experiments to evaluate the performance of our proposed mechanisms: MTC-TSM, MAC-TSM, PCE-WSM, and PIR-CPM on both real-world and synthetic datasets. We compare our proposed mechanism with TRAC [31] .
A. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
We use both real-world and synthetic datasets to evaluate the performance of our proposed mechanisms. The realworld dataset is Foursquare [45] , which has check-ins made in New York and Tokyo collected over 10 months (from 12 April 2012 to 16 February 2013). In our experiment, the data collection scenario can be getting the gas price around the workers' home, like Waze [46] . We set the gas station to be the tasks, and the home locations of users to be the location of workers which are private. There are 224 gas stations and 164 homes in Tokyo within latitude (35.50,35.85) and longitude (139.45,139.90), and there are 416 gas stations and 582 homes in New York within latitude (40.55,41.00) and longitude (-74.3,-73.7). The average distance between any two tasks is 0.1592 kilometers in Tokyo and 0.2099 kilometers in New York, respectively. We construct a synthetic dataset through randomly generating the locations of tasks and workers within a 10km × 10km area, and the average distance between any two tasks is 5.1960 kilometers.
In the experiments, we randomly select a certain number of gas stations and homes as the locations of tasks and workers, respectively. We test all proposed mechanisms with different datasets, by varying the number of tasks, the number of workers and travel budget for workers. We evaluate the performance of our proposed mechanisms with five metrics: the ratio of winners (WR), the average utility (AU), the total travel distance (TTD), the total payments (TP) and the rationality rate (RR).
• WR: the ratio of the number of selected workers to the number of total workers.
• AU: the average utility of selected workers. The revenue for a worker is defined in (4).
• TTD: the total travel distance of all selected workers.
• TP: the total payment that the platform pays to all selected workers.
• RR: the ratio of the number of selected workers who receive the non-negation payment to the number of total selected workers. We compare our proposed mechanism with TRAC [31] , which is truthful and has 100% individual rationality. In TRAC, all workers send their real travel cost to the platform. The workers' location privacy is ignored.
B. EVALUATION OF MTC-TSM AND MAC-TSM
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our proposed MTC-TSM and MAC-TSM. We adopt TRAC in [31] to select winners for the platform. The workers mainly care about the probability of being selected as a winner (WR) and the average utility (AU). Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 show the performance of the two proposed task selection mechanisms on these two metrics. Fig. 3a and Fig. 4a show the effect of the dataset. In New York, we randomly select 20 tasks and 300 workers. Each worker has a travel budget randomly selected from the range [0.2,0.3]. In Tokyo, we randomly select 10 tasks and 100 workers. Each worker has a travel budget randomly selected from the range [0.15,0.25]. In the Synthetic dataset, we randomly select 30 tasks and 500 workers. The workers' travel budget varies from 1 to 5. We can see that workers in Tokyo have a larger probability of being selected as a winner. That is because the task distribution in Tokyo is much sparer than others. Workers in Synthetic dataset receive more revenue as they have a larger travel budget and travel more distance to take tasks.
We use the New York dataset to evaluate the effects of other parameters on our proposed mechanisms. mechanisms. Fig. 3b and Fig. 4b show the WR and AU against the number of workers when there are 20 tasks. Each worker's travel budget varies from 0.15 to 0.25. We can see that the WR and AU decrease heavily with the increase in the number of workers. That is because the competition became more intense when there are more workers, and the number of tasks is fixed. Moreover, MAC-TSM has a larger WR and AU than MTC-TSM, and the difference between MAC-TSM and MTC-TSM becomes smaller with an increase in the number of workers. Fig. 3c and Fig. 4c show the WR and AU against the number of tasks when there are 400 workers. Each worker's travel budget varies from 0.15 to 0.25. We can see that the WR increase linearly with the increase in the number of tasks. The more tasks are published, the more workers are selected to finish them. There is a slight decrease in the AU the number of tasks is less than 20 in MAC-TSM and 40 in MTC-TSM, then it increases with an increase in the number of tasks. That is because the revenue is mainly determined by the competition between workers. When there are not enough tasks, more workers will be competing for the same tasks, and the average utility will decrease. When there are a large number of tasks, the number of workers competing for each task reduces, which increases the AU. As in the previous experiments, MAC-TSM also has a larger WR and AU compared to MTC-TSM. Fig. 3d and Fig. 4d show the WR and AU against the workers' travel budget when there are 20 tasks and 300 workers. The travel budget is a random variable which follows a uniform distribution. The mean of travel budget varies from 0.15 to 0.35, and the variance equals to 8.33E-4. We can see that WR and AU decrease significantly with the increase in travel budget in MTC-TSM, while it decreases a little in MAC-TSM. That is because MTC-TSM tries to maximize the total travel distance under the constrained travel budget. When the travel budget increases, each worker can take more tasks, therefore, fewer workers are selected. Since the competition is intensive when the travel budget is small, the AU in MAC-TSM is less than that in MTC-TSM when the travel budget is smaller than 0.25. From Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 , we can see that the MAC-TSM always has a larger WR and AU than MTC-TSM, which is because the workers select fewer tasks in MAC-TSM compared to MTC-TSM, and more workers are selected to finish all tasks. The workers in MAC-TSM try to minimize the average cost of selected tasks; they receive less payment but gain more revenue than workers in MTC-TSM. Therefore, the workers in MAC-TSM gain more by doing less, because of which workers prefer MAC-TSM in real-world applications.
C. EVALUATION OF PCE-WSM
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our proposed PCE-WSM. The platform mainly cares about the total social cost for finishing all the tasks. Here the social cost is the total travel distance (TTD) of all selected workers. As mentioned before, workers prefer MAC-TSM in real-world applications. Therefore, the workers' bids are generated by MAC-TSM in the following experiments.
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our proposed PCE-WSM. The platform mainly cares about the total social cost for finishing all the tasks. Here the social cost is the total travel distance (TTD) of all selected workers.
As mentioned before, workers prefer MAC-TSM in realworld applications. Therefore, the workers' bids are generated by MAC-TSM in the following experiments. Fig. 5 shows the performance of the PCE-WSM on the total travel distance. We can see that PCE-WSM always has a slightly higher total travel distance than TRAC in which the worker submits the real travel cost. That is because PCE-WSM can protect workers real travel cost and allow workers to submit obfuscated cost. The difference in the total travel distance between TRAC and PCE-WSM can be seen as the cost of privacy protection. We can see that the extra cost of privacy protection is no more than 18.85% of the total travel distance in TRAC. In some cases, the total travel distance is even the same for PCE-WSM and TRAC, such as in Fig. 5b where the number of workers is 300 and in Fig. 5c where the number of tasks is 20, 30 and 40. In addition, we can see the total travel distance decreases with an increase in the number of workers, and it increases with an increase in the number of tasks. With more workers, the competition becomes intensive, the total travel distance decreases. While with more tasks, workers should travel more to finish all tasks, then the total travel distance increases. As mentioned in the previous section, the travel budget has little effect on the performance of MAC-TSM. So the total travel distance fluctuates with a varying travel budget.
D. EVALUATION OF PIR-CPM
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our proposed PIR-CPM. The platform cares about the total payment (TP) and the individual rationality rate (RR). Fig. 6 shows the performance of PIR-CPM on the total payment. We can see that PIR-CPM always has a smaller total payment than TRAC. That is because the platform always selects workers whose obfuscated travel distance are smaller than their real travel distance. If the obfuscated travel cost is higher than its real travel distance, the worker may not be selected as a winner since the platform selects workers with a higher cost-efficiency. Therefore, all selected workers have smaller faked travel distance in PCE-WSM than that in TRAC. And the critical payment mechanisms are determined by the submitted travel distance. Besides, we can also see that different parameters have similar effects on the total payment like that on the total travel distance. That is because payment is mainly determined by the total travel distance. The difference between the total payment and the total travel distance is the cost of truthfulness. Fig. 7 shows the performance of the PIR-CPM on the rationality rate. We can see that PIR-CPM can always achieve more than 85% rationality rate. The amount of added noise mainly determines the rationality rate. In the experiment, we allow each worker to add no more than 20% noise of his real travel distance with a probability of no less than 80%. Therefore, the rationality rate is more than 85%. In some cases, it is more than 93.4%. In a real application, the workers can select their privacy level freely, and their rationality is determined by the privacy level they select. If a worker wants to have a non-negative profit with a probability, no less than θ , and the added noise is no more than γ times his real travel distance, which can be described as follows:
where θ is the confidence coefficient and γ is the ratio of added noise. He can set his privacy level by the following equation: Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 shows the performance of the PIR-CPM on the total payment and the rationality rate. PIR-CPM always has a smaller total payment than TRAC, at the expense of individual rationality, since TRAC can achieve 100% individual rationality. In real-world applications, workers are always willing to protect their location privacy at the expense of their payments. Therefore, PIR-CPM is more acceptable in practical applications.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigate task bidding and task assignment for workers and platform, respectively. We proposed two task selection mechanisms for workers: MAC-TSM and MTC-TSM. MAC-TSM is more popular with workers than MTC-TSM as workers have a higher probability of being selected as winners and gain more revenue from the platform. To protect workers' location privacy, workers sanitize the real travel distance with differential privacy before submitting it to the platform. We proposed the PCE-WSM to select workers efficiently, and PIR-CPM to pay workers probability individual rationality for the platform. We proved that PIR-CPM is truthful and min w i ∈S P(p i > b i )-individual rationality. We conduct extensive experiments on both the synthetic datasets and real datasets. The results demonstrate that our proposed PCE-WSM can achieve enough privacy preservation without incurring a high payment compared to TRAC. β j e β j +
Finally, we combine the two cases and have P(r(β i ) ≤ r(β j )) = 1 2 +
where sgn is the Sign function. Hence, equation (18) 
